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The World Trade Organization has been until recently 
an effective framework for cooperation because it has 
continually adapted to changing economic realities. The 
current Doha Agenda is an aberration because it does 
not reflect one of the largest shifts in the international 
economic and trading system: the rise of China. 
Although China will have a stake in maintaining trade 
openness, an initiative that builds on but redefines the 
Doha Agenda would anchor China more fully in the 
multilateral trading system. Such an initiative would 
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have two pillars. The first is a new negotiating agenda 
that would include the major issues of interest to China 
and its trading partners, and thus unleash the powerful 
reciprocal liberalization mechanism that has driven 
the World Trade Organization process to previous 
successes. The second is new restraints on bilateralism 
and regionalism that would help preserve incentives for 
maintaining the current broadly non-discriminatory 
trading order.  
China and the World Trading System 
 
 














Keywords:  China, trade, multilateralism, WTO, Doha Agenda 
JEL codes:  F1, F2, F5 
 
*Development Economics Research Group, World Bank. Email: amattoo@worldbank.org.  **Peterson Institute for 
International Economics.  Email:  asubramanian@piie.com. The authors are grateful to Richard Baldwin, C. Fred 
Bergsten, Chad Bown, Bernard Hoekman, Gary Hufbauer, Pascal Lamy, Patrick Low, Will Martin, Zanny Minton-
Beddoes, and Martin Wolf for helpful discussions and useful comments, and, in particular, to an anonymous referee 
for detailed comments. The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the 
World Bank, its Executive Directors or the countries they represent.   2 
 
Introduction: The Challenge 
The WTO‘s Doha Round of trade negotiations is on life support and there are intermittent and 
half-hearted efforts to resuscitate it. It would seem that the post-war framework for multilateral 
trade cooperation is under existential threat.  It is, however, premature to draw that conclusion.   
One of the under-recognized virtues of the multilateral trading system—embodied in the GATT 
and then the WTO—is that, unlike other international institutions such as the IMF or the UN 
Security Council, it has been until recently an effective framework for cooperation among the 
systemically important players.  The effectiveness is reflected in the fact that participation in 
decision making and the content of negotiations have continually adapted to changing economic 
realities.  In this light, the current Doha Agenda is an aberration because it does not reflect one of 
the biggest—indeed tectonic— shifts in the international economic and trading system: the rise 
of  China.    If  responding  to  the rise  of  China  becomes  an  important concern  of multilateral 
negotiations, the WTO cooperative framework can be revitalized. 
How  the  WTO  has  at  each  stage  of  its  existence  responded  to  evolving  circumstances  is 
described  in  Section  I.    Section  II  shows  that  a  significant  but  publicly  unacknowledged 
impediment to concluding the Doha negotiations is the WTO members‘ difficulty in coming to 
terms with China‘s trade juggernaut and the policies, such as the managed exchange rate, that are 
perceived to fuel it but are not part of the Doha agenda.  Section III takes a longer view and 
shows that, even with conservative assumptions about its growth and trade dependence, China‘s 
share of global trade is likely to be twice as large as that of the United States in 20 years. Section 
IV argues that China will continue to have a stake in maintaining an open multilateral trading 
system; and then assesses the implications of China seeking, as other dominant powers have 
often sought, to translate its power into trading privilege.   
Section  V  examines  how  international  cooperation  today  can  be  designed  in  a  way  that 
anticipates China‘s dominance.  In particular, we suggest that the time has come for an initiative 
on multilateral trade negotiations that builds on but redefines the Doha Agenda and that would 
anchor China more fully in the multilateral trading system.  Such an initiative would have two 
pillars.  First, a new negotiating agenda that would include the major issues of interest to China 
and its trading partners, and thus unleash the powerful reciprocal liberalization mechanism that 
has driven the WTO process to previous successes.  The agenda would be China-informed rather 
than China-centered.  Second, new restraints on bilateralism and regionalism that would help 
preserve incentives - especially in the context of a rising China - for maintaining the current 
broadly non-discriminatory trading order.  
I.  The WTO’s Responsiveness in Historical Context 
Looking  back,  there  were  four  distinct  bouts  of  the  GATT/WTO  responding  to  evolving 
circumstances after its creation in 1945.  The first accommodated European efforts at integration. 
The US, recognizing the political imperatives for integration within Europe, fostered it.  Then, 3 
 
when the US started to feel the discriminatory effects of European integration, and in order to 
mitigate these effects, it pushed strongly for reductions in MFN tariffs under various ―rounds‖ of 
multilateral trade negotiations.  President Kennedy, in his special message to Congress seeking 
support for the eponymous round, cited European integration at the top of the list of reasons for 
undertaking multilateral trade negotiations.  
 
The Tokyo Round of trade negotiations, launched in 1973, was an attempt to adjust to at least 
three major developments: the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, the 
oil  price  shock  and  the  rise  of  Japan  as  a  major  trading  power.  The  need  to  address  the 
competitive threat from Japan was reflected in the emphasis in the Tokyo Round negotiations on 
disciplining subsidies and permitting contingent protection against surges in imports.  
Next, as development and globalization proceeded apace through the 1980s, hitherto ―small‖ 
developing countries started growing in size and started becoming attractive to industrial country 
exporters  as  markets.  This  ―shock‖  of  the  economic  transformation  of  a  large  number  of 
developing countries meant that the previous equilibrium whereby developing countries were left 
out of the GATT process needed to be revisited.  
In the Uruguay Round, the larger developing countries were brought into the fold because their 
markets started to matter, and they had to take on many of the obligations previously assumed by 
only industrial countries. Thus, there was a greater convergence of obligations across members 
and the earlier two-tiered approach was diluted.  In fact, in the bid to bring the larger developing 
countries  into  the  fold  through  the  ―single-undertaking,‖  a  large  number  of  small  and  poor 
countries were also swept up – a form of ―democratic overshooting‖ that we return to in the 
conclusion. 
The negotiating agenda and the scope of the WTO have also been updated. Beginning in the 
1980s, when the United States perceived its comparative advantage to lie in the generation of 
intellectual property and in services sectors, it pushed for new international rules that would 
protect  intellectual  property  rights,  and  open  international  markets  for  IP-intensive  products 
(pharmaceuticals, software and movies) as well as financial and telecommunications services.  
The fourth major landmark for the WTO related to China. Beginning in the 1990s, when it was 
becoming  clear  that  China  represented  a  huge  market  access  opportunity,  the  US  and  EU 
launched efforts to reduce China‘s trade barriers. This initiative was assisted by the fact that the 
Chinese leadership, or at least some parts of it under Zhu Rongji, wanted to use the WTO as a 
means  for  furthering  domestic  reform  and  anchoring  it  in  the  WTO.  China  committed  to 
substantially reducing its barriers in agriculture, industry and services. China was not alone: a 
number of Eastern European and other communist countries like Vietnam also joined the WTO 
on similar tough terms. 4 
 
The trading system has accommodated an emerging China.  How will it adapt to and be shaped 
by a dominant China?  Our key argument is that while China will have strong reasons to sustain 
the open trading order, that cannot be taken for granted. The world needs to tether China to the 
multilateral system as an insurance against the small possibility that China will seek to translate 
its power into trading privilege.   
II.  China’s Current Trade Ascendancy and Its Implications 
China‘s trade ascendancy and presence are not a distant phenomenon. In manufacturing trade, 
China is now a large supplier to all the major markets, and its presence has grown significantly 
over the course of the Doha Round negotiations. We identify the world‘s ten largest traders and 
for each of them also identify the largest sources of supply in the manufacturing sector.
1 Figure 1 
presents the results. China‘s share in the major import markets has doubled between 2001 and 
2009, and in some of the most important world markets, China now accounts for more than a 
fifth  of  total  manufacturing  imports.  China‘s share  of  manufacturing imports  in  Japan is  35 
percent,  in the European Union about  30 percent,  and in the United States slightly  over 25 
percent.
2  
Furthermore, China looms especially large in the markets of major trading partners in sectors 
where protection is greatest. To illustrate this, we identify for each of the top ten trading partners, 
the ten most protected sectors (defined at the Harmonized Schedule (HS) 2 -digit level of 
aggregation in 2009 in terms of the MFN tariff alone ). Figure 2 depicts China‘s share in these 
sectors in the largest ten traders for 2001 and 2009.  
Two points are worth highlighting. First, in the most protected sectors, China‘s share of imports 
in 2009 is substantially greater than for overall imports (shown in Figure 1) and dwarfs that of 
any other supplier in each of these markets.
3 For example, China‘s share in these sectors in Japan 
is over 70 percent, in Korea over 60 percent, in Brazil about 55 percent, in the United States, 
Canada, and the European Union about 50 percent each. Second, even in these protected sectors, 
China‘s share has increased dramatically over the course of the Doha Round. In many of the 
importing countries (e.g., Brazil, the European Union, and the United States), China‘s share has 
more than doubled. Also striking is how much market share China has gained even in countries 
such  as  Canada,  Mexico,  and  Turkey  that  have  free  trade  agreements  with  close  and  large 
neighbors.  Thus,  liberalization  under  the  Doha  agenda  today,  especially  in  the  politically 
charged,  high-tariff  sectors,  is  increasingly  about  other  countries  opening  their  markets  to 
                                                            
1 This section relies on joint research with Francis Ng.  Throughout our analysis, we exclude two resource-intensive 
manufacturing categories: minerals, fuels, and oils (HS 27) and pearls, stones, and precious metals (HS 71). 
2 These figures may exaggerate China‘s dominance because trade is measured in gross terms rather than valued 
added terms (see Johnson and Noguera, forthcoming). 
3 Across countries and sectors, China features consistently as the most important supplier and often by a substantial 
amount. For example, in the United States, China has by far the highest share of imports in eight out of the ten most 
protected sectors, ranging from 22 percent in man-made fibers (HS 55) to 76 percent in footwear (HS 64).  5 
 
Chinese exports. In short, with some exaggeration one might say that the MFN tariff of countries 
is really a China tariff, or the China tariff is really the ―least-favored-nation‖ tariff.  
 
Source:  Mattoo, Ng and Subramanian (2011) 
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Figure 2 China's share in imports of 10 most protected 
sectors  in 10 largest importers, 2001 and 2009




Implications:  The elephant in the green room 
The  Green  Room  is  the  venue  for  key  WTO  negotiations.    And  there  the  great  shared  but 
unuttered  fear  is  of  competition  from  an  increasingly  dominant  China.
4 It seems today that 
progress in the Doha Round hinge s  critically on greater market opening not in servi ces or 
agriculture but in manufacturing (nonagricultural market access or NAMA in WTO -speak). 
Services negotiations have been given insufficient attention and are now widely regarded as too 
complicated to deliver significant market opening in this Round. In agriculture, with food prices 
high and expected to remain so, import protectionism has become less salient. Rather, it is the 
threat of agricultural export restrictions that is more serious, but addressing it is not on the Doha 
agenda anyway despite the efforts of some WTO members. So, Doha today is mostly about the 
negotiations on market access in manufacturing. And in manufacturing trade, as shown above, 
China looms large especially in the most protected sectors. 
But Chinese dominance per se should not  have precluded mutually beneficial bargains. The 
Chinese market, despite China‘s far-reaching WTO accession commitments, remains protected 
in  a  number  of  areas  (such  as  fertilizers,  vehicles,  and  certain  other  manufacturing  items). 
Moreover, as Laborde, Martin, and van der Mennsbrugghe (2011) have shown, other countries 
would also see increased exports from the proposed Doha liberalization by WTO members. The 
proposals of the United States and others to move further toward free trade in selected sectors 
could translate into even greater export gains.  
What then is stymieing the reciprocity mechanism that has delivered negotiating success in the 
WTO in the past? China‘s trade dominance has been achieved in large part by China‘s successful 
growth strategy, which has included an embrace of markets and an unusually high degree of 
trade openness (Subramanian, 2011). The problem, however, is the strong political perception 
that China‘s export success has been achieved, and continues to be sustained, in part by an 
undervalued exchange rate.  
It seems unlikely and politically unrealistic to expect China‘s trading partners to open further 
their markets to China when China is perceived as de facto (via the undervalued exchange rate) 
imposing an import tariff and export subsidy not just in selected manufacturing sectors but across 
the board. The evidence on the existence and extent of undervaluation continues to be debated. 
On the one hand, in a survey of studies on  renminbi misalignment conducted by Cline and 
Williamson (2008), 17 of the 18 studies concluded that the renminbi is undervalued; the average 
                                                            
4 While highlighting the difficulties for Doha posed by Chinese dominance, we do not exclude the possibility that 
there are other reasons for the Doha stalemate.  For instance, the United States is perceived to have progressively 
raised the bar – perhaps to politically impossible levels - in terms of what it seeks by way of trade concessions from 
other countries. 7 
 
estimate  of  the  undervaluation  was  19  percent  for  the  2000–07  period  as  a  whole  and 
considerably higher for the 2004–07 period. On the other hand, Dunaway, Leigh, and Li (2006) 
argue that all estimates of renminbi undervaluation are very sensitive to underlying assumptions 
about models and parameters and therefore not reliable. Nevertheless, the fear persists that China 
will gain even greater market share as a result of any trade liberalization in the Doha Round—not 
just in countries‘ own markets but also in third markets, in each of which the effects of the 
exchange rate are likely to be felt.  
One  sign  of  this  fear  is  that  industrial  and  especially  developing  countries  are  increasingly 
resorting to contingent protection against imports from China (Bown, 2010). For example, the 
share of developing-country antidumping actions against China (as a share of their total actions) 
increased from 19 percent in 2002 to 34 percent in 2009. The corresponding figures for industrial 
countries were 11 and 27 percent, respectively. But recourse to this instrument will become more 
difficult when  China  attains  market economy status in  2016. Moreover, the product-specific 
transitional safeguards that were negotiated at the time of China‘s WTO accession are due to 
expire in 2013. This leaves countries even more anxious about competition from China. 
Consider most starkly Brazil‘s predicament. Its currency has appreciated sharply (40 percent) 
over the last few years, while those of competitors in Asia, especially China, have not. Brazil has 
been trying desperately and repeatedly to use capital controls to stem these pressures on the 
currency. Its imports  from  China have surged, especially in the most protected sectors. The 
political economy would have to be very odd if Brazil, under the current circumstances, would 
lower trade barriers in these very sectors. And Brazil‘s tariffs in these sectors are  about 25 
percent on average (Figure 2). It is therefore not surprising that Brazilian Finance Minister Guido 
Mantega said in January 2011 that in relation to exchange rate policies, ―China and the United 
States are the worst offenders. This is a currency war that is turning into a trade war.‖
5 In fact, 
Brazil has submitted a proposal to the WTO arguing in favor of contingent protection measures 
against  imports  from  countries  with  undervalued  exchange  rates.  Recently,  the  government 
raised by 30 percentage points a tax on cars with a large percentage of imported parts after 
Chinese-made car imports surged. 
The  politically  charged  problem  of  trade  imbalances  with  respect  to  China,  especially  in 
manufacturing, is not restricted to Brazil alone. All of China‘s major trading partners, with the 
exception of South Korea, have witnessed a substantial widening of the wedge between exports 
to and imports from China. For example, both the United States and the European Union have 
seen the manufacturing trade deficit increase over three times to US$200 billion and US$250 
billion, respectively (figure 3A). But other large emerging-market countries have also seen sharp 
increases  in  their  trade  deficit  with  China  (figure  3B).  India‘s  Commerce  Minister,  Anand 
Sharma, said recently that the "trade imbalance with China has been a matter of concern. It has 
                                                            
5 It is unclear whether the Brazilian minister‘s equating quantitative easing by the US Federal Reserve with China‘s 
exchange rate policy is based on a kind of BRICs-solidarity or on a genuine belief in their symmetric effects.  8 
 
been discussed at the highest level when the prime minister met the Chinese president in Hanoi 
in  October  (2010)."  The  Brazilian  finance  minister  has  also  said,  ―We  want  to  export  our 
manufactured goods [to China] and export less in terms of commodities.‖  
From an economic perspective, it is the multilateral trade balance of countries that is important, 
which could be influenced by the exchange rate. But given China‘s large global trade surplus, the 
bilateral trade imbalance relative to China, which has been attributed in part to China‘s currency 
policy, has become a political problem for many countries.  
In effect, the whole basis for exchanging trade policy concessions is being undermined because a 
de facto trade policy instrument—the exchange rate—is seen as nullifying these concessions 
while remaining beyond the scope of multilateral negotiations and discipline. What China gives 
by  way  of  trade  concessions,  it  is  seen  as  undoing  through  its  exchange  rate  policy.  This 
connection  between  the  exchange  rate  and  reciprocal  trade  liberalization  has  not  received 
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Figure 3A China's trade balance in industrial goods with the 





Source:  Mattoo, Ng and Subramanian (2011) 
 
A corollary of our analysis is that unless Chinese currency policy changes significantly, and 
unless there can be credible checks on the use of such policies in the future, the perception we 
outlined above will remain. There are some signs that China has slowly but surely embarked on a 
process of internationalizing its currency that will over time eliminate the undervaluation of the 
renminbi. The horizon for renminbi internationalization is as yet unclear but it is unlikely to 
happen over the next year or two. 
III.  The Dominance to Come 
As shown in Table 1 and discussed in Subramanian (2011), within the next twenty years China is 
likely to be economically dominant: by 2030, its market-based GDP is projected to equal that of 
the US, its PPP-based GDP by then to be twice that of the US, China‘s trade in goods to be 
nearly two times that of the US and Europe, and the renminbi stands a good chance of nipping at 
the heels of the dollar, if not eclipsing it, as the main reserve currency. These projections do not 
require China to grow at anything close to the torrid rates of 11 percent that China has posted in 
the last fifteen years. They require China to grow at just under 7 percent a year over the next two 
decades. Nor do these projections require  China to maintain its current trajectory of steeply 

















India Russia Mexico Canada ASEAN-10 Turkey
billions of US 
dollars
Figure 3B  China's trade balance in industrial goods with major 




Table 1: Economic Weight in 2010 and 2030: Convergence Scenario 
 
Source:  Subramanian (2011) 
For projecting trade, economic theory and evidence offer guidance. Just as the force between two 
objects in physics depends on the product of their masses and the distance between them, so 
trade between two countries is thought to depend on their economic mass (GDP) and all the 
frictions affecting trade, including transport costs and policy barriers.  
 
The theoretical foundations of this so-called ―gravity model‖ have been solidified in recent years 
(see Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Subramanian and Wei, 2007; 
Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein, 2008).  Unlike economic convergence, which worked in theory 
but was realized in the real world incompletely and tardily, gravity as a determinant of trade has 
been robustly and consistently vindicated in the real world. 
From an analytical perspective, it is important to note that the shifts in trade are likely to be a 
direct consequence of the shifts in the economy via the ―gravity‖ effect.
6 The results are shown 
in  Table  2  (for  selected  countries).  If  gravity  exerts  its  expected  force,  the  effects  will  be 
striking, indeed even more striking than the effects on GDP. China, which accounted for 10 
percent of world trade in goods in 2010 will account for nearly15 percent in 2030. Its trade will 
be more than two times that of the United States and more than four times that of Germany, both 
of which will see a decline in their shares of world trade.  
 
                                                            
6 These projections assume an income elasticity of trade of 1.  If going forward, developments such as de-











































United States 47,284 14,658 23.5 16.8 66,519 24,019 17.2 11.8 12.1 8.0
EU-27 32,615 16,282 26.1 18.7 47,683 24,195 17.3 11.9 10.2 6.8
Japan 42,820 5,459 8.7 6.3 62,374 7,352 5.3 3.6 2.4 1.6
China 11,303 5,878 9.4 17.4 32,980 22,440 16.1 23.5 21.4 28.0
India 3,795 1,538 2.5 5.3 13,373 8,422 6.0 9.8 8.9 13.1
Korea 23,961 1,007 1.6 1.3 46,753 2,172 1.6 1.1 1.5 1.0
Africa 2,633 1,437 2.3 2.8 7,425 8,075 5.8 5.0 8.6 6.7
Brazil 16,684 2,090 3.3 3.7 30,874 4,624 3.3 3.3 3.3 2.9
Indonesia 7,890 707 1.1 2.1 23,022 2,917 2.1 3.1 2.9 3.8
Russia 23,803 1,465 2.3 3.8 35,782 2,058 1.5 2.3 0.8 1.1
Total 12,844 62,452 100.0 100.0 24,963 139,766 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
BRICs 9,112 10,972 17.6 30.2 24,063 37,544 26.9 38.7 34.4 45.1
Populous BIICs (Brazil, India, 
Indonesia, China)
8,325 10,213 16.4 28.5 23,539 38,402 27.5 39.6 36.5 47.8
Asia ex. Japan 7,417 11,129 17.8 31.5 21,376 45,234 32.4 45.7 44.1 56.4
Emerging and developing 7,906 21,355 34.2 52.5 19,369 74,060 53.0 67.4 68.2 78.6
2010 2030 Change (2030 -2010)11 
 
One of the subtler implications of the gravity model is that trade between two dynamic countries 
will grow exponentially faster than trade between less dynamic ones (because trade benefits from 
the gravity exerted by the income of both countries).  The share of intra-European trade which 
comprised about 29 percent of world trade in 2008 will decline to about 9 percent in 2030. In 
contrast intra-BRICs trade and intra-BIICs (including Indonesia rather than Russia) trade will 
rise dramatically; intra-Asian trade, which today is about a third of intra-European trade will 
surpass  intra-European  trade  well  before  2030.  In  other  words,  not  only  will  the  world‘s 
economic center of economic gravity shift to Asia, so too will the center of trade with China as 
the focal point, or even ―hub.‖ 
 
Table  2:  Share  of  Countries  in  World  Trade,  Convergence  Scenario,  2010  and  2030
Source:  Subramanian (2011) 
IV.  What Would Future Trade Dominance Imply? 
This section begins by noting that the odds are in favor of China maintaining an open multilateral 
trading  system.    But  then  we  assess  the  implications  of  another,  less  likely  but  still  real, 
possibility: that China will seek, as other dominant powers have done, to translate its power into 
trading privilege.   
Self-interested openness  
An economically dominant China will be a China that, like other leading powers, acts out of self-
interest—at least on key issues. But it is not necessarily a China that will seek to roll back the 
open trade and financial system bequeathed by the US after World War II. The view that China 
will broadly continue the current system relies on the fact that is exceptionally open.  
Taking account of China‘s size and the regularity that large countries tend to trade less than 
small countries, China is an exceptionally big importer and trader.  China‘s openness, measured 
in terms of trade outcomes, is far greater than anything achieved by the United States in the post-
war period and resembles the levels of openness achieved by the United Kingdom at the height 
Country/group Growth 
2010 2030 2010-2030 2010 2030 2010 2030
United States 3,224 5,827 3.0% 10.6% 7.3% 22.0% 24.3%
Japan 1,460 2,586 2.9% 4.8% 3.2% 26.8% 35.2%
China 2,972 11,972 7.2% 9.8% 15.0% 50.6% 53.4%
India  539 3,907 10.4% 1.8% 4.9% 35.1% 46.4%
Korea 892 2,617 5.5% 2.9% 3.3% 88.5% 120.5%
Brazil 384 991 4.9% 1.3% 1.2% 18.3% 21.4%
Indonesia 136 993 10.5% 0.4% 1.2% 19.2% 34.0%
Russia 648 890 1.6% 2.1% 1.1% 44.3% 43.3%
Germany 2,318 2,918 1.2% 7.6% 3.7% 89.7% 76.0%
WORLD 30,387 79,905 5.0% 100.0% 100.0% 48.7% 57.2%
Trade to GDP Share in world trade Trade (US$ billion)12 
 
of empire. To recap those numbers, the ratio of trade to GDP for the US rarely exceeded 15 
percent during Pax Americana compared with China‘s current ratio of 57 percent (Table 3).  
Table 3:  Trade Patterns of Economically Dominant Powers in History 
  
Actual  trade 









(controlling  for 





(controlling  for 
size,  income  level, 
and  oil-based 
economies)
a 
   United Kingdom: 1870  (sample = 26 countries) 
Exports  12.2  339.3  84.0  n.a. 
   United States: 1975  (sample = 121 countries) 
Exports  6.7  -16.5  -49.8  -48.3 
Imports  6.5  -38.7  -39.6  -47.5 
Total trade (exports plus imports)  13.3  -29.7  -45.3  -47.5 
   China: 2008 (sample = 136 countries) 
Exports  31.6  73.5  67.7  99.0 
Imports  24.9  56.3  56.4  39.5 
Total trade (exports plus imports)  56.5  70.7  68.6  74.1 
a. Negative value denotes undertrading.  Notes: n.a. = not available.    Over and under-trading are derived from a regression of 
the relevant trade measure on population (column 2), population and per capita GDP (PPP) (column 3), population, per capita 
GDP (PPP) and a dummy for oil producers (column 4). In each of these regressions, the coefficient on the dummy for the UK 
(1870), US (1975), and China (2008) yields the magnitude of over-trading or under-trading for the relevant country. Strictly 
speaking, since the variables are specified in log terms, over/under-trading is obtained as the exponential of the coefficient on the 
relevant dummy variable minus 1. 
The fact of China‘s trade-dependence will tend to create a strong stake for China in maintaining 
an open trading and financial system. Historians and political scientists have argued that trade, 
and the intertwining of interests that it brings, is no guarantee against economic or military 
conflict: Germany just prior to World War I, was also a major trader.  But there are two critical 
differences: China is trade dependent in a way that the US or even Germany never was, and 
moreover,  given  China‘s  low  levels  of  income,  China‘s  stake  in  openness  might  be  greater 
because its rise to  prosperity, on which  is  predicated the legitimacy  of its  government, will 
depend upon an open system.   
Post-World War II, the United States fashioned such a system out of enlightened self-interest. In 
contrast, China‘s interest in this system might be much more existential and strong because of its 
low level of income.  
Moreover,  the  depth  of  China‘s  international  integration  may  itself  preclude  protectionist 
measures.  Industrial country firms have made large relationship-specific investments in China, 
outsourcing  assembly  and  intermediate  goods  and  services  production;  Chinese  firms  have 
formed  strong  links  with  locally-established  foreign  manufacturing  firms,  foreign  banks, 13 
 
retailers, telecommunications and transport providers, and are increasingly investing abroad.  As 
a result, the business functions of Chinese customers and suppliers of goods and services are 
highly intertwined with their counterparts in other countries.  Any protectionist action would 
threaten these relationships and be self-destructive.  This mutual dependence situation gives rise 
to political economy forces that could counteract protectionist pressures. 
There is another reason for believing that China‘s stake in an open system is deepening. China is 
in fact promoting and seeking the rise of the renminbi. The latest five-year plan states the goal of 
renminbi internationalization and ―gradually‖ realizing renminbi convertibility. Over the last two 
years, it has taken several steps to promote the international use of the renminbi in trade and 
financial transactions. As a result, the stock of renminbi-denominated bonds issued overseas is 
expected to reach between 180 and 200 billion dollars from negligible amounts a few years ago.  
Moreover, renminbi internationalization offers the political exit for Chinese policy-makers from 
their  mercantilist  strategy.   When  the  currency  consequences  of  internationalization  start 
affecting, and eliciting opposition from, the export interests, the Chinese authorities will seek to 
overcome that by playing up the benefits of international reserve status of the renminbi. The 
calculus then will be that the economic losses (reduced exports and valuation losses) are matched 
by the gains to national prestige from encouraging the rise to reserve currency status of the 
renminbi.
7 The trumpeting of symbolic and nationalist gains could serve to drown out the 
protests of those who might suffer substantive losses. ―renminbi rules‖ could be the slogan of 
China‘s policy-makers to exit from mercantilism.   
In this sense, it is encouraging that China is becoming more of a routine participant in WTO 
dispute settlement proceedings both as an initiator of disputes and as a respondent. It is also 
encouraging that so far, China has largely agreed to comply with the terms of WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings.  For example, of the eight cases brought by the United States, three have 
been resolved by a memorandum of understanding, two are pending decision, and in three China 
has  alleged  compliance  with  the  decision  of  the  Dispute  Settlement  Body.
8 China‘s  actual 
compliance  will  take  some  time  to  ascertain  especially  given  the  vast  amount  of  economic 
activity controlled or directed by the state. But there are indications that China takes its WTO 
commitments seriously.  
Translating power into privilege 
Even if China has a broad stake in preserving the multilateral trading system, the scope for 
skirmish and conflict exists. Even the United States manipulated the trading system to its own 
advantage, for example, by maintaining for long periods, quantitative restrictions in textiles and 
                                                            
7 The key economic benefit of a reserve currency is, of course, the ability to borrow more cheaply than otherwise, 
but if China remains a net creditor this benefit may not be of great value.  
8 Interestingly, CFR (2011) suggests that ―U.S. companies are reluctant to be seen as encouraging or supporting 
WTO cases especially against China, fearing that it could lead to retaliatory measures that would harm their existing 
market access or benefit competitors‖ (p 52). 14 
 
clothing, trade-distorting subsidies in agriculture, allowing relatively easy recourse to contingent 
protection in manufacturing, requiring trade partners to impose voluntary export restrictions in 
automobiles and steel, and perhaps most egregiously, pushing through rules on the protection of 
intellectual property despite the vehement opposition of developing countries.     
So, is the current open, rules-based economic system safe? History's lesson is that we can never 
be sure. We cannot be certain that the enmeshing of interests will be strong enough to sustain the 
status quo. Nor is there a cast-iron guarantee that the current ideological embrace of markets as 
the  predominant  basis  for  organizing  economic  relations  will  survive  the  vicissitudes  of 
intellectual  fashion,  the  selective  and  self-serving  interpretations  of  policymakers,  and  the 
financial crises that will inevitably shock the modern global economy. There is tail-side risk that 
interests, ideology, and institutions, both domestic and international, will be inadequate to the 
task  of  preserving  the  current  system.    And  then  there  is  always  the  unforeseeable  and  the 
irrational.  
There is, therefore, still the possibility that China could seek to leverage its power in certain 
ways, including: pursuing industrial and protectionist policies domestically; capturing exclusive 
access to resources abroad; and obtaining privileged access to markets by entering discriminatory 
arrangements with selected partners.  
The temptation to exercise power need not stem from some sinister motive on the part of China 
but  simply  from  the  fact  that  increased  size  confers  greater  market  power.    Economic  self-
interest then dictates that a country exploit this power to improve its welfare by influencing its 
terms-of-trade, by increasing the price of its exports and/or reducing the price of its imports 
(including raw materials).  In fact, the GATT/WTO has been seen as primarily a mechanism for 
large countries reciprocally to forego exercising market power (Bagwell and Staiger, 2004).  So, 
our call for a China-inspired round of trade negotiations is to recognize that the previous bargain 
struck  at  the  time  of  China‘s  WTO  accession,  may  no  longer  be  an  equilibrium  (from  the 
Chinese perspective).  Hence, a new bargain may need to be struck, which would reflect China‘s 
increased size.  
Reneging on existing obligations 
The first concern is that China may not live by the obligations that it has already assumed.  Four 
examples are often presented: China‘s IPR regime, China‘s currency policy, China‘s services 
trade regime, and China‘s export restrictions, with the first being a case of possible violation of 
the letter of WTO law, the second a case of violating the spirit of WTO law, the third inhabiting 
the  murky  ground  in  between,  and  the  fourth  being  inconsistent  with  China‘s  accession 
commitments.
9 In each case, the tension arises bec ause of the inconsistency between certain 
national policy goals and its WTO commitments.  
                                                            
9 See also WTO (2010) and Stewart (2010). 15 
 
China  faces  a  particular  challenge  in  reconciling  the  WTO  obligations  on  the  protection  of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) with its goal of improving access to cutting-edge technologies 
for its  national firms.  Here  it is relevant  that  China‘s dominance  will be  associated  at least 
initially not with technological leadership – as in the case of its predecessors Britain and the US 
– but with technological catch-up.  So in the implementation of IPRs, it may favor technogical 
dissemination over creating incentives for innovation to an extent that creates tensions vis a vis 
its TRIPS obligations. For instance, the U.S. ITC (2011) estimated, based on a survey of more 
than five thousand U.S. IP-intensive firms, that the losses to U.S. industry from IPR infringement 
in China totaled roughly $48 billion in 2009 and that U.S. companies spent nearly $5 billion that 
year to combat this infringement.  These estimates raise the question of whether China is flouting 
the rules in the WTO‘s TRIPs agreement that require countries not only to embody in their laws 
adequate levels of IP protection, but to implement the laws ―effectively and expeditiously.‖ 
Consider China‘s exchange rate policy. In the case of China, its accession to the WTO is widely 
acknowledged to have led to considerable liberalization and hence to circumscribing China‘s 
ability  to  use  trade  policies  for  mercantilist  purposes.  Recall  that  China‘s  export-focused 
development strategy began in the mid-1980s but it did not start generating consistently large 
current  account  surpluses  until  the  oughties.  It  is  not  a  coincidence  therefore  that  China‘s 
mercantilism started to emerge after China‘s accession to the WTO. With constraints on the use 
trade policy instruments  (including export subsidies) to sustain the export juggernaut,  China 
turned to use policy instruments other than trade, namely the exchange rate (Rodrik, 2009). But 
undervalued exchange rates not only sustained exports, it also generated surpluses.  
China made far-reaching promises to rapidly – perhaps too rapidly - liberalize services as part of 
its accession to the WTO.  These commitments encompassed whole swathes of the economy 
which  had  previously  been  closed  to  foreign  participation,  ranging  from  transport  and 
telecommunication  to  finance  and  retail.  In  banking,  for  example,  foreign  banks  had  been 
virtually shut out at the time of accession, but China committed to eliminate all restrictions over 
the next seven years.  The problem is that the measures affecting entry into services markets, 
such  as  licensing  requirements  and  procedures,  allow  for  significant  regulatory  discretion.  
Recently the US complained about Chinese measures affecting trading rights and distribution 
services for certain publications and audiovisual entertainment products, and the WTO panel 
found that these measures were indeed inconsistent with China‘s WTO obligations.  In other 
cases, it can be harder to disentangle the protectionist from the legitimate.  For example, when 
China decided to impose minimum working capital requirements for each direct branch of a 
foreign  bank  located  in  China  rather  than  applying  (as,  for  example,  the  Europeans  had 
requested) minimum capital requirements and capital adequacy ratios to the overall commercial 
presence of a bank in China, it was hard to tell whether the goal was to ensure financial stability 
or to inhibit foreign competition.  The broader concern is that the WTO‘s services rules are not 
sufficiently sophisticated to prevent de facto back-sliding on de jure ambitious commitments. 16 
 
A WTO panel ruled against certain export restrictions China maintained.  This dispute concerned 
restraints on a number of raw materials, including various forms of bauxite, coke, fluorspar, 
magnesium, and zinc. China is a leading producer of each of the raw materials which are used to 
produce everyday items as well as technology products. The WTO panel found that China's 
export duties were inconsistent with the commitments that China had agreed to in its Protocol of 
Accession to eliminate all export duties and not to apply export quotas. The Panel also found that 
export quotas imposed by China on some of the raw materials were inconsistent with WTO rules.  
In particular, China had argued in its defense that some of its export duties and quotas were 
justified because they related to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources for some of the 
raw  materials.    But  China  was  not  able  to  demonstrate  that  it  imposed  these  restrictions  in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption of the raw materials so as 
to conserve the raw materials.
10 
Trade economists often invoke the image of Ulysses‘ tying himself to the mast to illustrate the 
value of binding commitments.  Some WTO members may feel that the Chinese experience 
resembles more closely the activities of Ulysses‘ wife Penelope who unraveled by night the 
shroud of Laertes she wove by day to keep her suitors at bay. China liberalized by joining the 
WTO  and  is  seen  as  undoing  some  of  this  through  exchange  rate  undervaluation,  weak 
enforcement of intellectual property rights and protectionist use of regulatory discretion.   
ii. Keeping markets closed 
A  second  source  of  conflict  could  arise  in  areas  which  are  not  currently  covered  by  WTO 
commitments or rules for China. Three important examples include the specific services where 
China has not assumed liberalizing commitments, government procurement where it has so far 
not assumed any international disciplines, and technical regulations where WTO rules allow 
significant national discretion.  In these areas, the key issue is whether China will choose the 
path of greater openness – either unilaterally or in the context of reciprocal liberalization - or will 
continue to maintain certain restrictions on foreign participation. 
China has made great strides in removing policy barriers as part of its WTO accession.  But 
although it is highly open in terms of trade outcomes, it still protects domestic producers from 
foreign competition.  According to Borchert, Gootiz and Mattoo (2011), China‘s services sector 
policies are more restrictive than the average level of restrictiveness of low and middle income 
countries  and  much  more  so  than  those  of  the  high  income  countries  in  all  sectors  except 
transport (Figure 4). 
 
 
                                                            
10 The Panel acknowledged, however, that China appears to be heading in the right direction in adopting a 
framework to justify its quotas under WTO rules, but that the framework is not yet WTO-consistent as it still has to 
be put into effect for domestic producers. 17 
 
Figure 4:  China’s Services Trade Policies in International Perspective 
 
Public procurement in China represents well over 20% of China‘s economy (Anderson, et al. 
2011).  A  recent  study  by  the  European  Union  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  foreign-invested 
enterprises  (FIEs)  competing  in  China‘s  public  procurement  markets  found  the  regulatory 
framework governing this enormous and increasing amount of economic activity is fragmented, 
inconsistent and unevenly implemented.  Common challenges encountered by EU businesses 
when  competing  for  public  contracts  included  ―difficulty  in  obtaining  timely,  accurate 
information about upcoming projects;  lack of communication of detailed evaluation criteria for 
projects;  decentralization  of  tenders  leading  to  more  costs,  less  transparency;    unfair 
implementation  of  public  procurement  awards;    and  unsatisfactory  appeals  procedures.‖  The 
WTO‘s Trade Policy Review on China also finds that ―China continues to face challenges in 
implementing  a  consistent  and  transparent  approach  to  procurement  across  all  levels  of 
government.‖
11 
China  is  not  yet  a  member  of  the  WTO‘s  government  procurement  agreement.  The  WTO 
Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) is a plurilateral Agreement which comprises 
only a subset of the full Membership of the WTO.   China has applied for accession to the 
                                                            
11 WTO Trade Policy Review, China. Chapter 3, page 41, paragraph 70. WTO Document WT/TPR/S/230, World 
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Agreement,  and  while  Anderson  (2008)  notes  that  ―work  on  the  accession  of  China,  while 
obviously a complex and challenging undertaking, is progressing well,‖ it is evidently not an 
easy negotiation.   
iii. Using dominance to gain discriminatory access to foreign markets 
Historically, political power  has translated into trade  advantage through privileged  access to 
markets  and  to  resources.    How  much  do  these  concerns  still  matter?    To  an  extent,  these 
concerns are less salient, because of fundamental changes in policy, institutions and markets.  
Levels of protection are generally low today and legally bound at the WTO.  So preferential 
access to markets matters less than when protection was high or could be raised vis-a-vis third 
countries.  For example, the level of imperial preferences in 1936 was about 6-12 percent and 
was estimated to be twice that level in the preceding decade (McDougall and Hutt, 1954).  As 
discussed below, most preferences granted in the context of regional agreements today are much 
lower – because applied tariffs are much lower and because areas of high protection tend to be 
excluded  from  the  agreements.  But  we  cannot  take  small  preference  margins  for  granted, 
because in areas like services trade and government procurement, multilateral disciplines are 
incomplete and there is considerable scope for discretion in sourcing.   
As far as current preferential agreements are concerned, China is today more sinned against than 
sinning.  The number of such agreements has increased from about 70 in 1990 to almost 300 
today.  All WTO members except Mongolia have concluded at least one, and some such as the 
European Union, Chile and Mexico, more than 20.  Some of the large traders have already 
concluded agreements with each other or about to do so, e.g. EU-Mercosul, Japan-Mercosul, EU-
India and India-Japan. Today about half of the exports of the 30 largest exporting countries go to 
partners with whom the country has some sort of preferential agreement.  Meanwhile, China 
itself has concluded agreements only with a few countries, notably those in ASEAN, Peru, Chile 
and New Zealand.   
But a closer look reveals that many of these agreements have had a limited impact in creating 
preferential trade (WTO, 2011) reflected in the fact that only 16 per cent of goods trade actually 
takes place on preferential terms.   The reasons for this low share are that over one half of trade 
is already subject to zero MFN rates where there is no room for preferences; and many products 
with high tariffs (e.g. in agriculture) are excluded from preferential agreements, so that trade still 
occurs at MFN rates.   
Even in this world of limited preferences, China enjoys fewer privileges than other countries.  
Only about 6 percent of its exports enjoy preferential access – which is significantly below the 
world  average,  and  low  compared  to  other  large  traders,  such  as  the  European  Union  (13 
percent), United States (22 percent), India (26 percent) and Brazil (15 percent) (Table 4).  Not 
only  do  a  relatively  small  proportion  of  China‘s  exports  enjoy  preferential  access,  its  non-
preferential exports are also somewhat disadvantaged.  For most countries, less than 10 percent 19 
 
of non-preferential exports face MFN tariffs greater than 5 percent but for China (along with 
Japan and the EU‘s external trade) the proportion is twice as high (WTO, 2011). 
Table 4:  Preferential trade by exporter, 21 large exporters
 
Source:  Based on WTO (2011). 
Many preferential agreements, including some of China‘s agreements, now also have a services 
dimension.  Fink and Molinuevo (2008) and Marchetti and Roy (2008) have shown that these 
agreements typically involve wider and deeper commitments than those which countries have 
made under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) at the WTO.  In other words, 
countries include more sectors and legally commit to greater openness in preferential agreements 
than they do multilaterally.  But most of these commitments hover above applied policy and very 
few have had a liberalizing impact.  For example, India has committed to allowing maximum 
foreign ownership of 25 percent in basic telecommunications under the GATS, to 49 percent in 
some of its preferential agreements, but in practice it already allows 74 percent.  Even in the rare 
cases, where preferential agreements have induced liberalization, say in Costa Rica‘s elimination 
of its telecommunications monopoly, the new policies are at least in principle applied on a non-
discriminatory basis.  Thus the cost of exclusion today from a preferential agreement in services 












TOTAL 16.3 5.7 10.5 30.2 11.3 18.9 52.3
China 5.5 0.6 4.8 38.4 19 19.3 55.4
EU-extra 13.1 5.2 8 42.1 18.4 23.7 43.1
United States 21.7 19.5 2.2 30.2 10.4 19.8 46.5
Japan 0.5 0.3 0.2 57.7 24.7 32.9 39.6
Canada 45.7 7 38.7 7.5 2.8 4.7 46.4
Korea, Rep. of  7.7 0.1 7.7 39.5 12.9 26.5 51
Russian Federation 5.7 0.1 5.6 16.5 4.1 12.4 77.6
Mexico 63.9 13.2 50.7 1.8 0.8 1 34
Malaysia 14 2.7 11.3 14.1 5.3 8.9 70.2
Switzerland 34.1 6.6 27.6 14.9 9.7 5.3 48.9
Australia 2.9 0.1 2.7 21.1 8 13.1 75.4
Singapore 18.9 6.2 12.6 13.3 2.8 10.5 66.4
Thailand 26.8 6.9 20 15.1 8.4 6.7 54.1
India 25.9 2.6 23.3 24.7 9.9 14.8 48.3
Brazil 15.3 4.3 11 26.4 8.5 17.9 56.9
Norway 18.1 8.2 9.9 8.7 3 5.8 72.9
Indonesia 20.6 4.3 16.2 15.6 8 7.7 61.3
Turkey 64.8 38.6 26.2 16.9 5 11.8 17.6
South Africa 21.5 3.4 18 15.1 5.8 9.3 62.4
Philippines 11.6 2.9 8.8 7.6 4.2 3.4 78.9
Chile 27.3 11.5 15.9 7 2 5.1 63.5
Exporter
Share of trade by preferential margin(PM) and MFN rate (in per cent of total trade)
Preferential exports20 
 
is  not  worse  access  but  less  secure  access,  because  these  agreements  involve  not  more 
liberalization but wider and deeper bindings.   
It  would  be  wrong,  however,  on  the  basis  of  this  evidence  to  underestimate  the  potential 
discriminatory  effect  of  preferential  arrangements.    In  agriculture  and  some  manufacturing 
sectors,  like  textiles,  tariffs  are  still  high.    In  services,  any  future  deepening  of  preferential 
agreements  could  create  significant  discrimination  against  outsiders  because  MFN  levels  of 
protection  are  significant,  and  there  is  considerable  scope  for  the  preferential recognition  of 
standards, licensing and qualification requirements.  Strong exclusionary effects could also arise 
from ―deeper integration‖ along other dimensions:  preferential agreements increasingly have 
provisions  on  investment  protection,  intellectual  property  rights,  government  procurement, 
competition policy, and technical barriers to trade. A discriminatory tariff may matter less than 
the  selective  recognition  of  product  safety  standards  or  selective  access  to  government 
procurement markets.    
To sum up, preferential agreements have so far had limited discriminatory effects, so excluded 
countries such as China have not suffered much disadvantage.  But if deeper agreements are 
negotiated in future, adverse effects for excluded countries could be much more significant.   
iv. Using dominance to gain discriminatory access to natural resources  
China has so far revealed more interest in obtaining privileged access to natural resources than in 
seeking privileged access to markets.  One reason may be that its most significant export markets 
are large industrial country markets which are mostly open. In contrast, natural resources are 
located in smaller developing countries that are more susceptible to Chinese influence.  Still, 
given the diversified and competitive nature of many natural resource markets, it is not clear that 
there  is  any  serious  danger  of  vertical  foreclosure  –  i.e.  of  Chinese  control  depriving  other 
countries of competitive access to natural resources.  
China‘s resource anxiety stems from the fact that it is a large importer and vulnerable to the 
concentration of supplies in a few countries.  In natural resources, its dependence is already 
evident across the board.  For example, as Table 5 shows, China accounts for 65 percent of world 
imports  of  iron  ores  and  concentrates  and  80  percent  of  its  imports  come  from  just  three 
countries – Australia, Brazil and India. In food, at this stage imports – with the exception of soya 
beans - still account for a small share of total consumption, but ultimately the binding constraints 
of land and water combined with growing demand can increase import dependence.
12    
A response to this dependence has been investment abroad, in a bid to secure long-term access to 
resources.  As  Figure 5 shows, a large proportion of its FDI flows  – in 2009, as much as 70 
percent – is in natural resources.  While China‘s share in global FDI flows in natural resources is 
                                                            
12 China accounts for 54 percent of world imports of soya beans and 98 percent of its imports come from just three 
countries – USA, Brazil and Argentina. 21 
 
not high enough to justify fears of monopolization, the share has doubled from 7 to 14 percent 
between 2003 and 2010.  China‘s FDI is unusual in another respect:  in recent years, nearly 80 
percent of FDI flows have originated from state-owned or controlled firms, raising concerns in 
some recipient countries (Rosen and Hanemann, 2009). 
Should  this  response  of  China  to its  own  perceived  dependence  be a  source  of  concern  for 
outsiders? Much will depend on how concentrated are the markets for natural resources. As long 
as markets are competitive and sources are diversified, China‘s actions will have limited effect 
on other countries.  For example, in the key energy sector, energy types are becoming more 
diversified and within particular ones—for example oil and natural gas—there are more sources 
of supply.  
Table 5: China's Major Imports of Natural Resource Products (Excluding Agricultural 
Raw Materials and Fuels) and their Shares, 2009 
 
Source:  UN COMTRADE database. 
Moreover, just as WTO bindings constrain the scope for preferential access to markets, a WTO 
provision – GATT 1994 Article XVII on State Trading Enterprises – is meant to prevent state 
traders and investors from departing from the MFN principle.  Thus, in principle, even a state-
owned firm based abroad could not divert its output in a discriminatory fashion to its home 
country.    However,  even  though  this  provision  extends  to  all  such  enterprises  ―wherever 
located,‖  it  is  not  clear  that  WTO  rules  can  oblige  a  country  to  ensure  its  firms  honor  its 
obligations even when they are located outside its territory.  How this provision is interpreted 
and applied will have a crucial bearing on how much scope countries like China have to secure 
privileged access to resources by investing abroad. 
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% of World 
Imports
2601 Iron ores and concentrates, incl roast 50,140 69.3 64.9 Australia Brazil India 40.1 25.7 15.2
2603 Copper ores and concentrates. 8,479 11.7 27.9 Chile Peru Australia 24.2 16.1 12.7
2608 Zinc ores and concentrates. 1,883 2.6 36.8 Peru Australia EU27   28.7 27.2 9.9
2602 Manganese ores and concentrates 1,773 2.5 52.3 Australia South Africa Gabon 36.6 22.4 12.2
2607 Lead ores and concentrates. 1,737 2.4 44.1 Peru USA EU27   30.4 16.8 12.1
2610 Chromium ores and concentrates. 1,311 1.8 75.3 Australia Brazil India 40.1 25.7 15.2
2604 Nickel ores and concentrates. 1,057 1.5 54.2 IndonesiaPhilippines Australia 30.4 26.2 22.4
2515 Marble, travertine, ecaussine  861 1.2 55.0 Turkey EU27   Egypt 39.2 29.1 15.0
2613 Molybdenum ores and concentrates. 766 1.1 24.4 Chile USA EU27   45.8 20.4 7.1
2503 Sulphur of all kinds, other than sublime 705 1.0 37.8 Canada Saudi Arabia USA 18.0 17.9 10.7
Natural resources, excl agric goods 72,332 100.0 41.1
0-97 All goods 1,005,555 8.3
Major Suppliers (and their shares)22 
 
 
Source:  Kierkegaard (forthcoming 2012). 
Finally, exclusivity in access can arise by restricting exports of resources where a country itself 
has a major share of the resource.  In China‘s case, concerns have already arisen, as discussed 
above, because it restricted exports of rare earth metals, for some of which (e.g. scandium and 
yttrium) it accounts for more than 70 percent of the world‘s exports, as well as of other key raw 
materials, such as various forms of bauxite, magnesium, and zinc, where again it accounts for a 




V.  Anticipating Dominance:  Implications for Policy and International Cooperation 
The high probability scenario is one of China having a vested interest in an open trading system 
and hence acting, even leading, to preserve it. But we cannot be sure – even the United States 
was tempted to manipulate the trading system to its own advantage, as discussed above.  
From the Chinese perspective, there will inevitably be a weighing of the benefits of adhering to 













































































































Figure 5: China's FDI in Natural Resources
(share of China's total FDI (left scale); share of Global FDI in 
natural resources (right scale))23 
 
and minimal political frictions – and of seeking more advantageous bilateral or plurilateral deals 
by exploiting its growing economic heft. 
From the perspective of the rest-of-the-world, there is tail-side risk and perhaps the need for an 
insurance  policy  against  the  contingency  of  China  leveraging  its  power  to  secure  trading 
privilege. One way of signaling that the world community recognizes the need to deal with a 
dominant China in the future and the need to do so multilaterally would be embark on a new 
initiative on trade negotiations—a China-inspired agenda—whose aim would in fact be to anchor 
China, to the maximum extent possible, in the multilateral trading system.  
However, we would first note that large parts of the current Doha Agenda, such as the market 
access negotiations in manufacturing, agriculture and services, as well as the domestic support 
issues in agriculture, remain relevant, perhaps even more so in the context of a rising China.  
Consider two examples.  Even though China made striking commitments to open its services 
markets as part of the accession negotiations, some explicit restrictions – e.g. limits on foreign 
ownership  in  telecommunications  and  life  insurance–  and  implicit  impediments  –  e.g.  the 
exercise of regulatory discretion in financial services and the awarding of licenses–still remain.  
Services exporters from other countries have a strong interest in the huge and growing Chinese 
market  and  have  argued  strongly  for  the  elimination  of  remaining  impediments  and  greater 
regulatory transparency.  Since China itself is developing an interest in exporting services – its 
exports of services have grown at over 18 percent per annum over the last decade – there may be 
the basis for a bargain, especially if industrial countries and larger emerging market countries are 
willing to lock-in openness to cross-border trade in business services and allow Chinese FDI 
without creating implicit barriers.  
In agriculture, China's subsidies to farmers increased six-fold between 2008 and 2010 to $147 
billion (OECD, 2011).  The OECD report suggests that in absolute figures, China's subsidies to 
farmers were higher than those of the United States, and even in terms of the proportion that 
subsidies contributes to farm income, China's was at 17 percent in 2010, over twice that of the 
United States' 7 percent. The number and scope of programs providing budgetary support to 
agriculture  has  been  increasing  and  to  an  increasing  extent,  take  the  form  of  direct  income 
support payments. In this respect, China seems to be conforming to a broader trend whereby 
countries,  as  they  become  richer,  switch  from  taxing  to  subsidizing  agriculture.    These 
developments make the domestic support elements of the agricultural negotiations even more 
relevant.    
We identify new elements of a bargain that might be possible in the context of a rising China.   
Some of these elements, such as climate change-motivated trade actions and exchange rates, are 
not at all addressed in the Doha agenda, while others, such as food and investment security, are 
only partially addressed.  We identify both areas in which China will seek market opening and 24 
 
concessions from other trading partners and areas in which China will need to open its markets 
or accept other disciplines in response to demands by its trading partners.
13    
Security of access to food, energy, and other resources 
China  will  be  a  large  importer  of  energy  and  foodstuffs  in  the  medium  term.  It  has  a  big 
incentive in ensuring that partner countries do not restrict their exports of these commodities.  
Pressure on food supplies, and associated high food prices, could be a medium- to long-term 
reality because some of the driving factors—rising prosperity in the developing world, which 
creates more demand; high fuel prices; stagnant agricultural productivity; and climate-change 
induced pressure on agricultural supplies—could also be of a durable nature.  In this broader 
context,  China‘s  quest  for  self-sufficiency  is  likely  eventually  to  run  up  against  the  twin 
constraints of land and water. 
These fundamentals are being exacerbated by two types of trade policy interventions: export 
restrictions on foodstuffs, and trade-related biofuel policies in the industrial countries. In the 
food crisis of 2008, 18 countries imposed some form of export restrictions (World Bank, 2008). 
If in bad times, China is subject to the export-restricting actions of producing countries, like 
Argentina in soya beans, trade will be seen as an unreliable way of maintaining food security; 
there will be a greater pressure to move toward more self-reliance as insurance against the bad 
times.  This is costly.  
 Much better would be to have a system where both imports and exports remain free to flow in 
good  times  and  bad.  The  Doha  round  has  been  devoted  to  traditional  forms  of  agricultural 
protection—trade  barriers  in  the  importing  countries  and  subsidies  to  food  production  in 
producing countries—which are now becoming less important as food prices have soared and 
import barriers have declined.
 14  It would be in China‘s interest to enlarge the trade agenda so 
that trade-related biofuel policies, such as tariffs on imported ethanol, and all trade barriers, both 
on imports and exports, are put on the trade agenda.
15 
                                                            
13 Some parts of this section draw on ideas first presented in Mattoo and Subramanian (2009). 
14 Not surprisingly, WTO members that depend heavily on world markets for food have pushed for disciplines on 
export controls and taxes (e.g. Japan and Switzerland in 2000, and Congo, Jordan, and Korea in 2001). Recognizing 
that importers‘ concerns about the reliability of supply might inhibit liberalization, some exporting countries too 
have advocated multilateral restrictions on the right to use export restrictions (e.g. the Cairns Group and the United 
States in 2000 and, more recently, Japan and Switzerland in 2008). See International Economic Law and Policy 
Blog (2008). 
15 Protection measures designed to encourage the use of domestically produced biofuels are subject to WTO rules on 
binding of tariffs and other duties and charges, and would normally be expected to be subject to reductions in 
protection under the Doha Agenda negotiations on reductions in agricultural (ethanol) or nonagricultural (biodiesel) 
tariffs. One surprising feature of the current negotiations is that the important protection of ethanol—which diverts 
the sourcing of ethanol from lowest-cost international sourcing to a reliance on domestically produced maize—is not 
currently subject to significant tariff reductions because almost all of this protection is provided by a measure 
classified as an Other Duty and Charge. 25 
 
Most medium term projections assume high and rising energy prices—fueled by rising demand 
in  emerging  market  economies  such  as  China  and  India  and  uncertainties  about  available 
supplies created or rather resuscitated fears about energy security. There is a scramble for oil 
resources as countries such as China and India seek to obtain direct control over them through 
foreign direct investment.  
An  important  factor  underlying  rising  prices  is  the  cartelization  of  oil  markets  by  the  oil 
exporters. It is one of the striking omissions of the trading system that there are no multilateral 
rules on government restrictions affecting the most important traded commodity.  The world and 
China will have a vital stake in securing energy security, and therefore in designing multilateral 
rules against collusive behavior that threaten energy security, always allowing for legitimate 
exceptions on the grounds of price stabilization and environmental protection.  Such cooperative 
action would spare China and other countries the costs of unilateral action to secure supplies. 
But China has been on the other side of the resource equation too. China‘s restrictions on exports 
of rare earths have created anxiety in the rest of the world because it is the almost exclusive 
supplier of these minerals crucial to global electronics, defense and renewable energy industries.  
But, as noted above, the WTO ruled recently – after being asked to do so by the European Union 
and the United States - that China breached its accession commitments by curbing exports of 
eight raw materials.  Even though China has appealed the decision, it will be under pressure to 
allow the exports of these resources and the decision may also have some precedential value in 
discouraging export restrictions on rare earths.  In the circumstances, it may be more amenable to 
clearer general principles outlawing not just prohibitions and quantitative restrictions on exports, 
but also export taxes which can have the same effect.  This is especially so because China itself 
is dependent on imports of highly concentrated natural resources – as discussed above. 
Security of access for foreign investments 
In some cases, Chinese foreign investment has provoked anxiety and protectionist sentiment. The 
most prominent recent case has been the Chinese technology company Huawei which has been 
denied permission on a number of occasions to buy American companies because of its alleged 
links to the military. Similarly, the European Commission is investigating whether action needs 
to  be  taken  to  prevent  takeovers  by  publicly  controlled  foreign  investment  funds.  But  such 
unilateral actions, which a number of countries are contemplating, could easily be construed as 
defensive and protectionist, especially if they are justified in the name of national security--as 
was the case when the U.S. Congress scuttled the China National Offshore Oil Corporation‘s bid 
for the oil firm UNOCAL in 2005.  
The case for a multilateral approach is clear. China, like other exporters of capital, including 
those in the Middle East, wants secure access to investment opportunities in foreign markets, and 
importers of capital have legitimate concerns about the motivations of state investors and the 
consequences of such transactions. Mutually beneficial bargains are there for the making. The 26 
 
WTO is an appropriate forum for such deals because it already regulates private and government 
investments in key service sectors, such as telecommunications, transport, and finance. One way 
to manage such investments would be to require countries importing capital, such as the United 
States and EU members, not to impose undue restrictions on investments. In return, investing 
countries would commit to following certain criteria--transparency, an arms-length relationship 
with governments, and the pursuit of purely commercial objectives--modeled after the voluntary 
code of conduct for sovereign wealth funds negotiated under the auspices of the IMF in October 
2008.  
Limits to climate change-motivated trade action  
Even though the climate change talks have lost momentum, policy action to address climate 
change is likely in the future.  Under the range of likely emissions reductions being envisaged by 
the  major  industrial  countries,  there  will  be  calls  to  offset  the  competitiveness  pressure  of 
imports from countries which make less ambitious reductions. The most extreme form of trade 
action  would  be  one  that  is  based  on  the  carbon  content  of  imports  and  applied  to  all 
merchandise  imports.  This  would  no  doubt  address  the  competitiveness  and  environmental 
concerns in high income countries but would come at the price of seriously damaging the trade 
prospects of developing country trading partners. It has been shown that such action would imply 
average tariffs on merchandise imports from India and China of over 20 percent and would 
depress their manufacturing exports between 16 and 21 percent (Mattoo, Ng, and Subramanian, 
2009).  
If there are problems with such extreme action, there are also political problems with inaction.  
We identify in our research intermediate solutions which broadly address the competitiveness 
concerns of producers in high income countries without inflicting serious damage on developing 
country trade.  This option is the least undesirable from a developing country trade perspective. 
Therefore,  as  part  of  any  international  agreement  on  climate  change,  China  could  seek  to 
negotiate rules  in  the  WTO  that  would  either  prohibit  all  forms  of  carbon-based  border  tax 




Government procurement has largely escaped WTO rules.  Given the evidence of opacity, lack 
of accountability, and discrimination in national procurement regimes, there are bound to be 
huge mutual benefits from liberalization.  A subset of, mostly industrial, countries are parties to 
the Agreement on Government Procurement and have promised not to discriminate against each 
other.  But non-members like China are not assured of fair treatment in other countries.  The total 
size of the government procurement market has been estimated to be 15-20 percent of GDP in 27 
 
the OECD economies and an even larger share of GDP in the emerging markets.  WTO staff has 
estimated that the portion currently covered by the GPA is a little less than 3 percent of world 
GDP.  For China, an obvious incentive is to gain assured access to the procurement markets of 
industrial  and  larger  developing  countries  and  is  consistent  with  China  being  a  competitive 
supplier across the board.   
At  the  same  time,  China‘s  government  procurement  is  large  and  highly  protected.  Trading 
partners  have  a  big  stake  in  reducing  this  protection.    The  Chinese  central  government  has 
indicated that it alone procures more than $88 billion in goods and services annually. When the 
procurement of sub-central entities is added, the size of the Chinese procurement market has 
been estimated to be more than $700 billion.  The WTO Secretariat estimates that at least one-
third could potentially be covered by GPA rules.  This is a big prize for other countries, and it 
may be the basis of a deal between the larger emerging market countries and the existing GPA 
signatories on mutual access to their procurement markets.  Other countries would of course 
want to negotiate adequate disciplines to ensure transparency and limits on discretion in Chinese 
procurement.    
Exchange rates 
As  noted  above,  the  perceived  undervaluation  of  major  currencies,  especially  the  Chinese 
renminbi, is a central concern for not just industrial countries, but also developing countries. 
Undervalued currencies are in effect both an import tax and an export subsidy, and the countries 
that maintain them wind up hurting the profitability of industries in states with which they trade. 
The link between trade and exchange rates is too strong to be ignored.
16 While Article XV:4 of 
the GATT recognizes a link between  the two, the weight of opinion is that it does not clearly 
prohibit undervalued exchange rates. 
For a number of domestic reasons, China will want to change its exchange rate policies. These 
include: the need to re -balance growth away from foreign to domest ic demand to avoid the 
vulnerabilities that China encountered when growth in its exports markets collapsed in 2008; to 
bring down high inflation; to avoid adding to the already high stock ($3.2 trillion) of foreign 
exchange reserves because of the additional losses that will accrue when the renminbi eventually 
appreciates; and to make the renminbi an international currency, which would require opening its 
capital account. But these changes might not happen quickly enough and a multilateral effort by 
trading partners to secure new rules against undervaluation might be a useful complement to the 
domestic imperatives faced by China to appreciate its currency.  A multilateral approach is also 
                                                            
16 Staiger and Sykes (2010) show that if the trade balance is assumed to be fixed or zero, then a devaluation has no 
effects on trade (via the famous Abba-Lerner symmetry theorem) and hence rule out a role for the WTO in relation 
to exchange rates.   However, their results are contingent on the key and unrealistic assumption that the trade 
balance is fixed or zero.  When this assumption is relaxed, a devaluation does have trade effects and hence the 
relevant issue is the appropriate international institutional framework for effective cooperation on exchange rates.     28 
 
needed to preempt the type of unilateral action of the kind that is being contemplated by Brazil 
and the United States, and hence to avoid the dangers of retaliation and escalation. 
One possibility going forward would be for the IMF and the WTO to cooperate on exchange-rate 
issues.  The  IMF  would  continue  to  provide  technical  expertise  to  assess  the  valuation  of 
currencies. But because undervalued currencies have serious consequences on trade, it would 
make sense to make use of the WTO's enforcement mechanism, which is credible and effective. 
The WTO would not displace the IMF; rather, this arrangement would harness the comparative 
advantage of the two institutions.   
 
Tightening disciplines on discrimination 
An  agenda  with  reciprocal  liberalization  involving  China  and  its  major  trading  partners  is 
critical. But might regional and bilateral agreements rather than a multilateral agreement be the 
way forward?  We think not, for several reasons.   
Promiscuous regionalism 
Advocates of this approach rely on the competitive dynamic it creates: if two countries negotiate 
preferential reductions of barriers, one or several outsiders will be hurt. These outsiders will then 
have an incentive to negotiate preferential agreements themselves, and so on until the goal of 
global  free  trade  is  achieved.  They  would  thus  favor  all  countries  negotiating  free  trade 
agreements, including with China.   
 
There  are  two  problems  with  this  approach  –  in  addition  to  those  of  trade  distortion  and 
complexity (―spaghetti bowl‖) identified by Jagdish Bhagwati (2009).  The success of bilateral 
agreements in the past in reducing barriers and generating the competitive dynamic for further 
liberalization  simply  cannot  be  applied  to  China.  The  most  important  successes  of  such 
agreements—NAFTA and Eastern and Central Europe—have largely involved a big economic 
power such as the United States or the European Union negotiating with smaller countries. As 
such, it is the smaller countries that have done most of the incremental liberalization. In these 
negotiations,  it  is  the  larger  countries  that  have  held  the  balance  of  negotiating  power  and 
influence and successfully used them. 
  
Going forward though, with China‘s growing size, the balance of negotiating power will be with 
China rather than its partners that are seeking bilateral agreements. A decade ago, the US too in 
its bilateral agreements sought to impose more stringent intellectual property protection than that 
negotiated  multilaterally,  as  well  as  labor  and  environment  standards  where  none  could  be 
negotiated multilaterally.  The key argument for multilateralism is that there will be enough 
combined heft among China‘s trading partners such that negotiating with China can be more 
balanced. For example, China might be willing to open its government procurement market in 29 
 
return for its major trading partners opening theirs. But China‘s willingness to open up in a 
similar manner in negotiations just with the United States or European Union or with some less-
weighty combination in a bilateral negotiation is far from clear. If the basic problem is the 
imbalance of leverage arising from China‘s size, bilateralism will by definition be less effective 
than multilateralism.  
  
If bilateralism will be less effective in securing market opening, a similar problem carries over to 
enforcement and the incentives to adhere to previously agreed-upon rules. China‘s incentive to 
abide by multilateral rules will be stronger than to abide by a series of bilateral agreements. The 
reputational costs and the effectiveness and legitimacy of enforcement would be a more effective 
deterrent in a multilateral context than regionally or bilaterally.
17 It is the opprobrium that is 
associated with being a deviant from the global norm —rather than a bilateral one—that is the 
most valuable weapon that the world can deploy in tying China today in a way that minimizes 
the prospects of an aggressively dominant China in the future.  
 
Hostile regionalism 
Suppose  instead  that  China‘s  major  trading  partners  enter  into  bilateral  agreements  among 
themselves but exclude China. To a limited extent, this is already happening:  there are more 
than 300 preferential agreements in place today while China itself has concluded only a handful, 
with ASEAN, Peru, Chile and New Zealand. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which the US 
is negotiating with eight Asia-Pacific countries, but not China and Japan, could also be seen in 
this light, as could India‘s agreements with Japan, Korea, the ASEAN countries and soon the 
EU.  The consequence if not the aim of more concerted efforts by large countries would be to 
encircle China and worsen the relative terms of its access to the markets of its trading partners, 
presumably to induce it to negotiate further mutual market opening.  
The problem with this strategy is that it will probably not be effective in the short run and will 
certainly  sour  the  prospects  for  cooperation  in  the  medium  to  long  run.    China  is  already 
dominant and increasingly beyond the scope of the threat of sanctions. China has enough market 
power to offer or deny to its Asian neighbors and enough cash to dangle to all those in need, 
from Africa to the heart (and not just the periphery) of Europe, to deter countries from pursuing 
this type of hostile regionalism. Long before China‘s trading partners can achieve encirclement, 
China will have negotiated free trade agreements with, invested in infrastructure in, and helped 
avert financial crises in some or many of these same countries.  
                                                            
17 In fact, very few regional enforcement mechanisms—not even NAFTA, which is perhaps the most well-
advanced—have the credibility that the WTO‘s dispute settlement mechanism does.  For example, the United States 





Hence an attempt at hostile regionalism will not only be unsuccessful, it will also leave behind 
bad memories. And what the system does not need is a dominant China nurturing resentments 
and harboring grudges against a hostile outside world.  
 
Chinese regionalism  
 
Suppose that a dominant China—in order to isolate a few target countries say the US and India–
were to return the favor and started negotiating free trade agreements in ways that enabled it to 
secure preferential access to other markets and granted preferential access to some countries to 
its own markets. It could do the same in terms of gaining discriminatory access to energy and 
natural resources in other countries.  
To  an  extent,  the  concern  that  China  could  secure  preferential  access  say  to  the  Asian  and 
African markets and discriminate against the US and India might be less salient because levels of 
protection are generally low today and legally bound at the WTO.  So preferential access to 
markets matters less than when protection was high or could be raised vis-a-vis third countries.   
But we cannot take small preference margins for granted, because in areas like services trade and 
government procurement, multilateral disciplines are incomplete and there is considerable scope 
for discretion in sourcing, and in some sectors in manufacturing such as apparel, protection 
levels are still high.  Moreover, there remains scope for China to grant preferential access to its 
markets to selected countries because of the still high levels of Chinese protection in its services, 
government procurement, and other sectors. On balance, a patchwork of discriminatory deals 
involving China and undermining the system cannot be ruled out. 
The limitations of regionalism:  The example of the Trans-Pacific Partnership  
The idea is now gaining ground that the TPP with the US in the lead and based on the idea of 
open regionalism could be an alternative to the multilateralism of the WTO as the next frontier of 
trade liberalization and also as the best way of engaging China on trade issues. The appeal of the 
TPP is, of course, related in part to the lack of progress on the Doha Round. But this appeal 
might be illusory. 
Consider two scenarios. In the first, the US embarks on a process of deep integration with a 
number of Asia-Pacific countries without China. To avoid the dangers of hostile regionalism, 
TPP countries could subscribe to the principle of open regionalism (a kind of conditional MFN 
principle whereby countries that embrace the terms of the agreement get all its benefits but not if 
they stay out) would apply. 
The problem with this approach is the following. China would never agree to just fall in line with 
rules in the negotiation of which it has not participated. For example, if TPP members negotiated 
rules against undervalued exchange rates, China would probably stay away. If so, this would 31 
 
hardly  achieve  the  objective  of  engaging  with  China  and  disciplining  problematic  Chinese 
policies which are key to maintaining the open character of the trading system. It could, of 
course get worse. China could construe TPP as an act of hostile regionalism that excludes China 
and in turn negotiate preferential agreements of its own—say with the EU alone—which would 
create significant trade diversion for American and other exporters because of high Chinese 
levels of protection in certain areas.  TPP could thus provoke China into playing the regionalism 
game in a way that could fundamentally fragment the trading system. 
In the second scenario, suppose that the US invites China to the TPP negotiating table to be part 
of the process of creating the rules. Would this really be superior to negotiating with China 
multilaterally, where the EU, Brazil and India would also be at the table? If the problem of a 
rising China is that it will have a lot of bargaining power by virtue of its economic size and 
dominance, then a multilateral process will add more negotiating heft on the other side of the 
negotiation.  How can it not help to have Brazil and India as part of the group putting pressure on 
China to adhere to better rules?  
In  sum,  the  TPP  will  either  exclude  China  (and  open  regionalism  may  have  little  sway  in 
persuading China to join) or will be less effective in engaging China because it would exclude 
other large trading countries—EU, Brazil and India—whose collective heft might be crucial in 
balancing the bargaining power of China.   
Multilateralism today for multilateralism tomorrow 
One way of keeping China anchored in the multilateral system would be for China‘s trading 
partners to say that ―not only in our dealings with you but also amongst ourselves, we will 
embrace multilateralism.‖ This would signal a belief in the intrinsic worth of multilateralism 
rather than just as an instrument to contain China.  One goal of such restraint today would be to 
prevent  a  dominant  China  tomorrow  from  pursuing  preferential  arrangements  tomorrow  that 
disadvantage excluded countries.  Another object would be to promise China improved ―relative 
access‖ to markets in return for its own liberalization. 
What would constitute a credible commitment to multilateralism?   There is considerable scope 
for  countries  to  fine  tune  their  level  of  commitment  to  multilateralism.    They  could  simply 
refrain from concluding new preferential agreements;  granting China (and other countries) an 
opportunity to accede to existing agreements, i.e. practice ―open regionalism‖; or go further still, 
and ―multilateralize‖ existing preferential agreements, i.e. extending the full benefits of existing 
preferential agreements to excluded countries, including China?  As we saw above, the world has 
already traveled some way down the preferential route, but preferential agreements have so far 
had limited discriminatory effects.  Adverse effects for excluded countries could be much more 
significant if these agreements were deepened.   
One option would be simply to freeze the status quo.  This could be done through a political 
commitment  or,  perhaps  more  durably,  through  strengthening  multilateral  rules.    The  latter 32 
 
would  involve  tightening  and  effectively  enforcing  Article  XXIV  on  regional  agreements  in 
GATT  1994  and  the  corresponding  Article  V  in  the  GATS  to  preclude  new  preferential 
arrangements. 
A stronger commitment in the form of ―open regionalism,‖ discussed above in the context of the 
TPP,  would  be  to  allow  any  excluded  country,  such  as  China,  to  join  existing  regional 
agreements provided it met the conditions for membership.  These conditions could include a 
reduction in tariffs to levels comparable with those of existing members.  This approach may be 
particularly appropriate for non-tariff barriers, such as product standards, and in areas such as 
government procurement, where greater progress in openness is feasible among smaller groups 
of countries.  In these areas, open regionalism would imply a willingness to extend to outsiders 
the same treatment as to participants in an agreement provided that they demonstrate that they 
apply, say, similar standards and themselves allow competitive access in areas like government 
procurement.  The basis for such openness already exists in current WTO provisions, such as the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, the provision in the GATS on mutual recognition of 
licensing, qualification and technical standards, and in the Government Procurement Agreement. 
The strongest, and politically most difficult, commitment would be to ―multilateralize‖ existing 
preferential agreements.  Countries would grant market access on a strictly MFN basis to all 
trading partners, ideally on the best terms – e.g. the lowest tariffs in goods and the most generous 
foreign  ownership  rules  in  services  -  currently  being  offered  to  any  partner.    While  such 
multilateralization seems on the face of it politically unrealistic, the fact that the gap between 
MFN and preferential terms is typically small in goods and non-existent in services means that it 
need not be very costly.  Whether countries are willing to go so far depends, first, on how much 
need there is to make a down-payment to China in terms of improved relative market access (by 
eliminating the adverse preference margins it currently faces) to induce it to further open its 
markets.  Second, it depends on how much need there is to create a strong precedent for non-
preferential treatment in anticipation of an increasingly dominant China. 
One issue is how far policy choices today by the rest of the world can influence China‘s behavior 
and policy choice tomorrow.  If the large countries today refrain from regionalism, can they 
induce a greater commitment to multilateralism tomorrow by China?  Can eliminating all forms 
of discrimination today preclude discrimination tomorrow?  What are the most important links 
between the present and the future?   
It is hard at this stage to provide a definite answer to these questions.  But the intertemporal link 
may  lie  in  a  combination  of  reputational  considerations,  durability  of  international  legal 
frameworks and the path-dependence of economic integration.  Preferential agreements today 
(whether they include or exclude China) weaken both the reputation of multilateral rules and the 
legal  principle  of  non-discrimination  and  set  a  precedent  for  departures  from  it.    They  also 
encourage the economic compartmentalization of the global economy and hence diminish the 
economic  costs  of  departing  from  non-discrimination.    Conversely,  multilateralizing  existing 33 
 
regional agreements  strengthens  the  reputation and  legal principle  of non-discrimination and 
enhances the political costs of departures from it.  It also encourages the economic integration of 
the global economy on the basis of comparative advantage and enhances the economic costs of 
departing from non-discrimination.   
We  would  note  that  the  reciprocal  liberalization  agenda--a  new  multilateral  bargain  that 
exchanges Chinese protection for protection abroad –would itself go a long way to addressing 
the problem of discrimination. The logic is simple:  the more competitive and less protected the 
market for resources and final goods, the less feasible it is and the lower the incentive to obtain 
privileged access, and the smaller the cost inflicted on others by doing so. But insofar as there 
are limits to this reciprocal liberalization, the additional disciplines on discrimination would be 
necessary and useful. 
VI.  Concluding Remarks 
Post-mortems of the failing Doha negotiations, for example by Schwab (2011), have highlighted 
the divergent interests of the new powers (notably China and India) and the traditional ones 
(such as the EU and US). Extrapolated into the future, this divergence leads to a pessimistic 
prognosis for future cooperation. However, there is much greater shared interest and scope for 
give-and-take between the old and new powers in an agenda that addresses the fresh concerns. 
Doha is failing not because the fundamental reciprocity mechanism of the WTO has broken 
down. It is failing inter alia because the issues of greatest concern for the private sector were not 
on the agenda for the reciprocity mechanism to work and because it did not take account of the 
rise of China. The new issues we are proposing—by no means comprehensive or exhaustive—
offer a greater chance for reciprocity to work. Implicit in our proposal is the recognition that it 
may not be possible to pursue the Doha Round as its stands to a satisfactory conclusion within 
any reasonable period of time. Therefore, a preparatory process for the China-inspired agenda 
that we are proposing should be launched at the Ministerial Meeting of the WTO scheduled for 
December 2011. 
But a number of important questions arise. The first relates to the negotiating process in the 
WTO, in particular the need to reform the problem of ―over-democratization.‖ The Uruguay 
Round created a wedge between de facto power and de jure power—conferring de jure power on 
the small and poor countries which are not and cannot be an important part of the reciprocity 
mechanism. In other words, unlike the IMF which has suffered from a democratic deficit and 
legitimacy problem, the WTO has suffered from over-democratization with potential blocking 
power even for those who are not the key protagonists of the system. If forward progress is to be 
made on any meaningful agenda, the negotiating process has to be streamlined so that small 
countries do not have a disproportionate say. In return for not holding back a new ambitious 
agenda, smaller countries must be offered two assurances: they would automatically receive the 34 
 
benefits of any new liberalization and could opt out of any obligations that  are not to their 
advantage. 
This new agenda would energize the large trading nations.  The status quo powers  --United 
States, Europe, and Japan-- crippled by debt and anemic growth prospects, are in desperate need 
of a productivity boost.  For example, the United States needs to transition toward a growth 
model that is less reliant on consumption and more on investment and exports, in line with 
President Obama‘s export goals. Internal reforms are vital, but global trade reform can be a 
useful complement, as argued in a recent Council on Foreign Relations report (CFR, 2011). A 
new agenda would offer growth benefits in a way that the current unambitious Doha agenda 
cannot.    Countries  such  as  Brazil,  India,  Mexico,  South  Africa  and  South  Korea,  could  be 
galvanized  by  an  agenda  that  meaningfully  deals  with  perceived  ―unfair‖  competition  from 
China  by  addressing  undervalued  exchange  rates  and  that  liberates  them  from  wasteful 
competition for natural resources by disciplining export restrictions and cartelization. 
Although we have framed the future issues for the trading system around China because of 
China‘s likely dominant role, we recognize that future negotiations will not be just about China. 
Indeed, other countries will have a lot at stake in specific areas. For example Latin American 
exporters will be key players in agriculture, the oil exporters on issues related to energy access 
and foreign investment, and the US and Europe on all issues. Future negotiations will thus have 
an essential multilateral character and trade-offs across sectors will have to meet the demands of 
some or all these countries. But our contention is that the broad nature of issues involving China 
affords the possibility for securing satisfactory reciprocal deals.  
There is also the question of China‘s willingness to engage in this new agenda. We cannot be 
sure, of course but three factors might be at play. First, the agenda includes issues that China has 
an important stake in pursuing: clear investment rules, restraints on climate change-related trade 
action, as well as assured access to resources (oil and food) and markets overseas.  
Second,  the  challenges  for  an  open  system  from  the  ―decline  of  the  west‖  should  not  be 
underestimated. If growth in industrial countries does not recover, income distribution continues 
to worsen, and economic opportunities shrink, the intellectual and political consensus in favor of 
open markets —in which China has a strong stake—will come under threat. There are already 
ominous portents.  
In the United States, for example, five leading intellectuals (three of whom are Nobel prize 
winners)  with  impeccably  cosmopolitan  credentials—the  late  Paul  Samuelson,  Alan  Blinder, 
Paul Krugman, Larry Summers, and Michael Spence—have expressed differing concerns about 
the impact of globalization on the US economy. They have all been careful not to advocate  
protectionist  remedies  but  their  concerns  could  lend  legitimacy  to  such  policies.  Not  least 
because the political support for free trade agreements has declined considerably among the 
public. More strikingly, a November 2010 Pew poll showed that only 28 percent of traditionally 35 
 
free  trade-minded  Republicans  expressed  such  support,  down  15  percentage  points  from  the 
previous year.  A new trade initiative which is seen as offering new export opportunities for rich 
countries could help keep protectionist interests at bay. 
Third,  even  on  those  issues  where  China  is  currently  defensive, there  are  incipient  signs  of 
domestic  political  shifts  in  line  with  shifting  development  priorities.  For  example,  China  is 
beginning to change its exchange rate policy because of the need to curb rising inflation, to 
reduce export dependence, and to internationalize the renminbi.  Similarly, China is taking action 
on climate change because it sees competitive advantage in being the leader in green technology 
and because the retreat of the Himalayan glacier threatens its supply of water. China also might 
eventually move away from or beyond its current technology policy because it has itself become 
an  exporter  of  technology.    If  reformists  in  China  could  use  the  relatively  one-sided  WTO 
accession process to implement key changes in policy, then surely a more symmetric WTO 
negotiation can empower progressive forces now to advance reforms that are in any case in the 
broader national interest. In this respect, it would help for China to articulate its vision for and 
role in forging the new system.  
A modicum of trust between trading partners based on broadly similar domestic institutional 
frameworks is necessary for international cooperation. In the case of China, the pervasive and 
often non-transparent role for the state in economic activity is sometimes seen as inconsistent 
with justiciable international rules and commitments. Our approach has been to decompose state 
involvement  into  its  constituent  elements—state  purchases  in  the  form  of  government 
procurement,  state  investments  through  sovereign  wealth  funds  -  and  to  suggest  how  these 
elements  might  be  the  focus  of  international  rules.  Our  approach  does  not  offer  a  perfect 
solution, but a combination of such an approach combined with progressive change in the basis 
of the Chinese economy seems the best way forward. For example, an important way that state 
involvement manifests itself is through cheap financing by state-owned banks of the Chinese 
industrial sector. Over time, though, pressures are building—because of the non-sustainability of 
investment rates of close to 50 percent of GDP, the declining share of labor in GDP—to move 
away from these manifestations of state capitalism.  
Another issue relates to the timing of any new multilateral initiative.  Even if China‘s dominance 
is a decade away, the likely duration of negotiations on any new agenda – five to ten years – 
would  argue  for  an  early  start.    For  example,  a  new  initiative  launched  in  2012  would 
realistically conclude around the end of this decade, with provisions going into effect even later, 
by when China‘s dominance may be clearly established. 
The WTO has been and can continue to be, uniquely amongst all the international institutions, a 
vital and effective forum for cooperation among the major nations, even one that will be as 
dominant as China. The current Doha Agenda may be dying, but the WTO is alive and, with the 
right agenda, could yet flourish. It could provide a much-needed growth boost to the status quo 
powers, and a means to consolidate competitiveness for the new powers. For, China it could 36 
 
provide an opportunity to signal its commitment to multilateralism and hence to being a benign 
hegemon, a panda bear rather than a dragon.  
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